The CHSH-protocol generates secret key from correlations that violate the CHSH-inequality sufficiently much. In this paper, a security proof against general attacks is provided for this protocol. The only assumption made in the proof is that the information accessible to any eavesdropper must be compatible with the impossibility of signalling. This results provide a secure key distribution scheme in situations where the honest parties distrust their apparatuses. The techniques developed for the proof are fairly generic, so that also other entanglement-based protocols can be proved secure by modifying the details. We also analyze a variant of the CHSH-protocol, which yields higher key rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
In entanglement-based protocols for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1] , two honest parties (Alice and Bob) sharing EPR pairs [2] can obtain a secure key by performing measurements. They can also certify that they have EPR pairs by observing sufficiently strong violations of Bell's inequalities [3] . When the EPR pairs are noisy, measurements only provide partially secret correlations. Then, in order to obtain perfect secret bits, the parties must perform a secret-key distillation procedure, with the assistance of local operations and public communication (LOPC) [4, 5] . A necessary step before implementing this procedure is to estimate how secret their correlations are. In other words, how much information about their outcomes an eavesdropper (Eve) has, in the worst case scenario. This is done by exploiting the monogamy of entanglement, which imposes tradeoffs between Alice-Bob entanglement and Eve's correlation with them [6] .
One way of estimating the degree of entanglement they share is by performing quantum tomography to their states [7] . But for doing so, they have to assume that the quantum systems they measure belong to a state space of a particular dimension d (usually two). This assumption, though strong, is usually not mentioned in the presentations of QKD. It implies that the honest parties must trust their apparatuses (see [8] for a detailed discussion).
A framework to analyze quantum correlations without caring about the dimension d is to consider them as, simply, non-signalling correlations [9, 10] . This follows from the assumption that no measuring process can be used to send information between distant locations. Clearly, this is a much relaxed assumption compared to quantum mechanics. Within this framework, one can forget about the origin of the correlations, it does not matter which kind of system is measured, and in particular, what is its dimension d. It is shown in [9] that, as long as the obtained correlations violate some Bell inequality, there is some degree of privacy in them -in the sense that secret key is needed to create the correlations.
The first protocol secure against a non-signalling Eve was presented in [10] . Unfortunately, the security proof provided, only works when the secret key rate is zero. More recently, the CHSH-protocol has been introduced in [8] , and has the advantage of being easy to implement with present-day technology. A security proof against individual attacks was provided in [8] . Here, we prove its security against completely general attacks. We also analyze a variant of the CHSH-protocol, the π/3-protocol, which yields higher key rates. We give a detailed explanation of the security proof for this protocol, because it is simpler. To extend this proof to the CHSH-protocol, we just mention how to modify it.
In section II we introduce the framework and explain the main results. In section III the π/3-protocol is detailed, and its security is proven in section IV. In section V we analyze the CHSH-protocol, and section VI is devoted to the discussion of the results.
II. DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS
Suppose that Alice and Bob share N pairs of physical systems, labelled by n = 1, . . . N . Alice measures her n th system with one among two observables, denoted by X n = 0, 1, obtaining the outcome A n = 0, 1. The outcomes and the observables for all systems are represented by the random variables
, which are correlated according to the probability distribution P AB|XY . The number P AB|XY (a, b|x, y) is the probability of obtaining the strings of outcomes a, b ∈ {0, 1} N when measuring x, y ∈ {0, 1} N . Consider the marginal distribution for Alice's two first systems P A1A2|X1X2 . The non-signalling assumption imposes that the choice of observable in one site cannot modify the marginal distribution for the outcome in the other site, for instance P A2|X1X2 = P A2|X2 [9] .
We quantify the non-locality of a 2N -partite distribution P AB|XY with the function
with coefficients The bound for local variable models [9] is
which for N = 1 is equivalent to the CHSH-inequality [11] . Therefore, the smaller B[P AB|XY ], the more nonlocal P AB|XY .
We assume that the only information accessible to Eve is the outcome E obtained when measuring a correlated physical system with an observable Z. We impose that the global distribution P ABE|XY Z is nonsignalling. When tracing over Eve, the marginal for the honest parties must be recovered
for all values of Z. Hence, an attack can be seen as a preparation of P AB|XY by means of a particular mixture. In principle, Eve can choose any mixture (4), and the decision can be made whenever she wants. Without loss of generality, she makes this decision at the end of the protocol, depending on the public communication.
In particular, if Eve knows the hashing function G that outputs the final key, the decomposition (4) can depend on G. This invalidates standard privacy amplification schemes [4, 5] , where the global distribution is fixed while the average over G is made. Public information reconciliation cannot be used neither, for the same reason. To sort this out, we consider secret key expansion instead of secret key generation: Alice and Bob initially share a large enough secret key which is consumed during the protocol, and at the end, they obtain a secret key which is larger than the initial one. Usually, an initial key is used to authenticate the public channel; but here we go further: Alice sends part of the information that Bob needs to correct his errors secretly, and also, the hashing function which outputs the final key is kept secret. In this scenario, the absolute amount of generated secret bits is meaningless, and instead, we consider the net gain of secret key.
Denote by P A1B1|X1Y1 the estimated distribution for a single pair of systems. It will be shown that the asymptotic (net) secret key rate attainable with the π/3-protocol is (5) where the conditional Shannon entropy is denoted by Of course, the entropy depends on the underlying distribution P , so whenever there might be ambiguity, we attach P as a subscript, e.g. H(X|Y ) P . Let us remark that the conditional entropy H(A 1 |B 1 , X 1 = Y 1 = 0) contains an average over B 1 , like in (6), but is conditioned on the event X 1 = Y 1 = 0, not meaning any average. The function B and the rate formula corresponding to the CHSH-protocol are slightly different than (1) and (5) . The rates obtained by optimally measuring a noisy EPR pair
where Φ is the projector onto |00 + |11 , are plotted in the figure, for both protocols.
The strongest notion of security in cryptography is the so called universally composable security. One calls a cryptographic primitive (for instance key distribution) universally composable, if it is secure in any arbitrary context [12] . The security that we show is not universally composable, but of the same kind as in QKD before the publication of [12] . We show the following: suppose that Eve chooses the input Z = z at the end of the protocol, obtaining the outcome E. Denote by E ′ all the information available to Eve, which includes E as well as all public messages exchanged by the honest parties. Let K and K ′ be the keys obtained respectively by Alice and Bob, and let P KK ′ E ′ |Z=z be the global distribution. Denote by P U the uniform distribution over the same alphabet as K. It is shown that, for any ǫ > 0
where for any vector Q, the L 1 -norm is Q 1 =
x |Q(x)|. Summarizing, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a family of protocols parametrized by N , whose result satisfy (8) and (9), and the rate tends to (5) as N grows.
III. THE π/3-PROTOCOL
The protocol described in this section is a variant of the CHSH-protocol, and has the advantage that proving its security is simpler; additionally, it yields larger key rates. This protocol shares some features with the general scheme for QKD analyzed in [5] . Hence, for a detailed account of these features we suggest consulting this reference. The π/3-protocol consists of the following six steps.
Measurements. Alice and Bob generate X n and Y n with distribution P Xn (0) = P Yn (0) = (1 − δ) for n = 1, . . . N , where δ is a parameter that can be chosen arbitrarily small as N grows. They perform the measurements according to X and Y , obtaining the outcomes A and B.
Symmetrization. This step is made in order to warrant that the distribution is almost product:
For this, the exponential de Finetti Representation Theorem given in [5] is used. Alice generates a random permutation of N items, denoted π, and publicly announces it. They make the transformation (a n , b n , x n , y n ) → (a π(n) , b π(n) , x π(n) , y π(n) ) for n = 1, . . . N , and discard the last N s tuples (a n , b n , x n , y n ). The safety parameter N s will be specified below; the important is that N s grows sublinearly (N s ≈ √ N ).
Parameter estimation. The honest parties use a sufficiently large number N e of tuples of inputs/outcomes (a n , b n , x n , y n ) to estimate the values of B[P A1B1|X1Y1 ] and H(A 1 |B 1 , X 1 = Y 1 = 0) for a single pair. In fact, they compute the worst-case values
where Γ is the set of single-copy distributions P A1B1|X1Y1 compatible with the observed data, up to a probability ǫ. The precise definition of Γ can be found in [5] . This step can be done through the public channel.
Basis reconciliation. Alice and Bob publicly announce the values x n and y n for the remaining N − N s − N e tuples, and reject all the ones for which x n = y n = 0 does not hold. The surviving pairs of bits (a n , b n ) constitute the raw key. Denote by N the number of such pairs,
For convenience, we relabel these pairs with n = 1, . . . N .
Information reconciliation. Alice picks a random hash function F and announces it publicly. She computes C = F (A) and sends to Bob the value of C secretly. This consumes as much secret bits as the length of the string C, which is N H wc plus some sublinear terms (see [5] for details). Bob uses (C, F ) to correct the errors in his string B, obtaining a string B ′ which is equal to A with high probability.
Privacy amplification. Alice picks a random hash function G and communicates it secretly to Bob. In order to consume few secret bits in the communication of G, the alphabet of G must be small. Hence, a two-universal class of hash functions [5] is not suitable for this purpose. But one can use the class of functions corresponding to the "extractor" constructed in [13] , whose size is poly(log N − log ǫ) bits. Then, only a sublinear amount of secret bits are consumed in this step, which does not modify the asymptotic rate (5). Alice and Bob compute K = G(A) and K ′ = G(B ′ ), respectively, which constitute their corresponding versions of the final key. The length of K and K ′ is N (− log B wc ) plus some sublinear terms.
Because N is equal to N plus sublinear terms in N , the length of the secret key obtained is N (− log B wc ) plus sublinear terms, and the length of the secret key consumed is N H wc plus sublinear terms. Also, the worst-case quantities B wc and H wc tend to the real ones as more systems are consumed in the estimation step. Summarizing, the rate at which net gain of secret key is obtained tends to (5) as N grows.
Suppose Alice and Bob share many copies of the noisy EPR state (7). The measurements that give the maximal rate (5) are the followings. For Alice, the directions in the Bloch sphere corresponding to X n = 0 and X n = 1 are respectively (1, 0, 0) and (cos 
IV. SECURITY PROOF
In this section we prove the security of the π/3-protocol, explained in the previous section. For doing so, we need to define the conditional maximum probability, the (conditional) infinite Renyi entropy and its smoothed version, respectively:
H ǫ ∞ (A|E) P = max
In order to generate the secret key K from the partially secret variable A, Alice uses an extractor [13] . The extractor produces a uniform secret string K of length H ǫ ∞ (A|E ′ , X = Y = 0), where 0 denotes a string of N zeros and E ′ is all the information available to Eve. A careful inspection shows that all the public messages exchanged during the protocol are completely independent of A. Hence, the relevant information in E ′ is only E. In order to obtain the security proof, we just have to bound the quantity H ǫ ∞ (A|E, X = Y = 0). Notice that the ǫ appearing here is not the same as in (8) and (9); the relation between the two ǫ can be found in [5] . The next lemma is the core of the proof, where the non-signaling constraint is imposed. Lemma 1. Let P AB|XY be a 2N -partite nonsignalling distribution, then
Proof. Because of non-signaling, the marginal for A is independent of Y , and inequality (16) is equivalent to
Let us first show (17) for the case a = 0. The two quantities in (17) are linear functions of the distribution: B[P AB|XY ] = B|P AB|XY and P A|X=0 (0) = M|P AB|XY , where the components of |B are (2), and the ones of |M are
where
In vector notation, the inequality we want to prove is
The only premise of Lemma 1 is that |P AB|XY is nonsignalling. Then, it must satisfy linear equalities like, for instance, 
All these equalities can be written as S|P AB|XY = 0, for some vectors |S . For example, the vector |S corresponding to condition (20) has components
We denote by S the set of all such vectors. The components of the rest of vectors in S are obtained by taking Denote by |B 1 the vector with components
Due to the form of (21) ||M 1 |. This implies that when making tensorproduct powers of |B 1 and |M 1 the inequality still holds. Therefore, all the components of |B − |M − |S are non-negative for any N , and as argued above, this proves (19). Now, in order to finish the the proof of Lemma 1, we show (17) for the remaining values a. Like when a = 0, for the rest of values of a, there is a vector |M a such that P A|X=0 (a) = M a |P ABXY . For any string a ′ , the components of |M a ′ are like the ones in (18) after the transformation (a n , b n ) → (a n + a
This transformation is just a relabeling of the outcomes, hence, when applied to |B and |M , the transformed inequality (19) still holds. Additionally, this transformation leaves the components of |B , defined in (1), unchanged. Thus, for all a the inequality (17) is satisfied.
2
Lemma 2. Let P ABXY E be the distribution for the global correlations after the parameter estimation step, and N ′ = N − N s − N e the number of pairs Alice and Bob share. Let B wc be the worst-case estimated value for B[P A1B1|X1Y1 ], defined in (11) . For any ǫ > 0 there exists a distribution P ′′ ABXY E satisfying both
where N s = N ′α and α = 2 ln N ′ . Proof. Let us use the short-hand notation C = (A, B, X, Y ). All the correlations are contained in P CE , and P C is the honest parties' marginal. The central tool for proving this lemma is the classical version of the de Finetti Representation Theorem given in [5] . According to that result, for any positive integer N s there exists a distribution P ′ C satisfying both
where sym[P ABXY ] denotes the average over all permutations of the N ′ pairs, dρ[P C1 ] is a probability measure over the set of single-copy distributions P C1 = P A1B1X1Y1 , and Q (Ns)
[PC 1 ] is an unknown N s -pair distribution which depends on P C1 . Obviously, the measure ρ[P C1 ] is the one obtained from the data in the parameter estimation step. We chose N s such that the right-hand side of (24) is ǫ, for instance N s = N ′α with α = 2 ln N ′ . Let Γ be a set of single-copy distributions P C1 such that if we take the integration (25) and restrict it to this set the result
Because B is a linear function symmetric on the pairs, we have
because (5/2) Ns is the maximum value attained by B on N s pairs. To finish, define the distribution P ′′ CE = P E|C P ′′ C , which, by triangular inequality satisfies (22). 2
It is important to note that, the statement of Lemma 2 also holds for any subset of systems after the parameter estimation step, with the proper rescaling of N ′ and N s . In particular, for the ones which constitute the raw key (X n = Y n = 0).
Lemma 3. Given a distribution P AE , for any ǫ > 0
Proof. Let P E be the marginal of P AE , and let P ′ E be a distribution constructed in the following way. Take P AE and reorder Eve's outcomes e = 1, 2, . . . such that the quantity max a P AE (a, e) is monotonically decreasing in e. Define e 0 as the maximum integer such that
P ′ E (e) = P E (e) for the rest.
The distribution defined as P
which after taking the logarithms, gives (28). 2 Theorem 4. Let P AE be the distribution after the parameter estimation step, then for any ǫ > 0,
Proof. Let P ABXY E be the distribution after the parameter estimation step, and P ′′ ABXY E the distribution which, according to Lemma 2, satisfies (22) and (23). Using Lemma 1 and the linearity of B we get
This inequality together with Lemma 2 and 3 suffices to finish the proof. 2
V. THE CHSH-PROTOCOL
The method used to prove the security of the π/3-protocol is very general, and can be applied to other protocols. In this section we briefly describe the CHSHprotocol, and indicate how to adapt the proof to it.
The CHSH-protocol is like the one described in section III, but with some differences (see [8] for a detailed explanation). The distribution for the measurements is uniform, P Xn (0) = P Yn (0) = 1/2, Bob announces Y publicly, and Alice keeps X secret. In the basis reconciliation step all outcomes are used for the raw key, independent of their corresponding inputs. Alice's version of the raw key is a ′ , where a ′ n = a n ⊕ x n y n for n = 1, . . . N , and Bob's version is b. In this protocol, the quantity that must be bound is the Renyi entropy
, because Y is public. This can be done by first getting a bound
N , where P AB|XY is any 2N -partite non-signaling distribution. The coefficients ofB (ỹ) are
where theỹ inB (ỹ) has a tilde in order not to confuse it with the index y of the vector. When making the average over Y the dependence on y disappears:
and the new function B ′ has coefficients
Putting all things together, and making a similar argument, one obtains the rate formula
When applying this formula to the noisy EPR state (7), with the observables that maximize the CHSH violation, one obtains the rate plotted in the figure.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results presented in this paper suggest that the rates which are secure against non-signalling eavesdroppers are smaller than the ones secure against quantum eavesdroppers. We think that this is so because the non-signalling assumption is weaker, and gives more freedom to the eavesdropper. However, it is shown in [14] that the protocol introduced in [10] gives a rate of one secret bit per EPR pair, if only individual attacks are considered. With the techniques introduced here, one can show that the unit rate is also achievable against general attacks. Clearly, this rate cannot be improved by additionally assuming the whole of quantum mechanics.
As can be seen in the figure, the rates which are secure against individual attacks are usually larger than the ones secure against general attacks. This could be due to one of the following reasons: (i) individual attacks are not optimal, or (ii), the rate formulae (5) and (35) are not tight, and can be improved. This improvement could follow from bounding a quantity different than P max (A|E).
The security proof presented here has two defects: (i) some of the public communication must be kept secret, and (ii) the security is not universally composable. In order to fix them, more knowledge about the nonsignaling extensions of the distribution (P A1B1|X1Y1 ) N to a third party is necessary. In our proof, the only information used is the bound on P max (A|E) that all such extensions must satisfy.
Summarizing, it was shown for the first time that secure QKD can be implemented with positive rate, under the sole assumption of no signaling. This is done with the CHSH-protocol, which can be easily implemented with present-day technology, and with the π/3-protocol. Note that we go beyond the philosophy of [1] in that there is still quantum mechanics, in particular the validity of Tsirelson's bound [15] , is assumed. In contrast, our approach is conceptually simpler in that all we assume is no signalling. These results also contribute to the understanding of quantum cryptography where the honest users do not trust their apparatuses [16] .
